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Functional Neuroimaging and the Law

A significant problem in using neuroimaging evidence will
be to establish the plaintiff’s baseline. In other areas, such
as damages for brain injuries, we currently rely mostly on
circumstantial evidence to establish the “before” pictures,
since medical evidence is generally not available.
At the very least, the increased ability to detect and
quantify emotional pain should force courts to reexamine
the policy concerns behind judicial limitations on the claims.
These advances may argue in favor of abolishing restrictive rules and treating emotional harm like any other injury.
Psychic injury should no longer raise the suspicions it once
did, and to the extent that the concern is the genuineness
or seriousness of the emotional harm, or the risk of fraudulent claims, these should be ameliorated through evidence
of genuine distress provided by brain imaging. Reasonable
foreseeability, which acts as a limit on recovery for physical
injury, but is much less predictable for psychic injury, should
become more applicable. Of course, the issue of causation
remains, that is whether the plaintiff’s emotional distress is
really due to the experienced events as opposed to prior history. Current judicial constraints may migrate to the issue
of causation rather than the genuineness of the claim.
To the extent that court-imposed limitations on the distress claim are part of the broader debate as to the appropriate extent torts should compensate intangible losses generally, it is unclear how neuroimaging will influence that
debate. In one regard, the information provided by brain
imaging could show that the injury is more like a tangible
than an intangible loss. This will argue in favor of treating
mental distress in a manner similar to negligently inflicted
physical injury. The classic arguments promoting tort recovery will come to the forefront and the arguments in favor of
limitation will move to the background. Thus, the policies
behind the general tort principle of accident avoidance—
including deterrence of culpable behavior, shifting the cost
of the injury to the culpable defendant, and compensating

the injured victim—are strengthened as evidence regarding
distress becomes more certain.
In another regard, if judicial limitations on NIED reflect
the fear of potentially large liability, then the limitations may
remain in place as an admittedly arbitrary but necessary
bright line. Consider the number of people who witnessed
the 9/11 attacks, either in person or through television, print
or computer media, and suffered genuine distress as a result. Allowing recovery for reasonably foreseeable mental
distress may prove too large a burden for defendants and insurance companies to bear; courts may not want to increase
the defendant’s burden out of fairness or proportionality
concerns. 
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In this commentary, we respond to Stacey Tovino’s invitation to reflect further on specific legal issues she raises in
relation to functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
and the law (Tovino 2007). Specifically, we take up the issue
of evidence law. We do this from a Canadian perspective

because, unlike in the United States, this topic has not
“been debated for almost 10 years” here (Tovino 2007,
44).
We start with claims about fMRI from websites of two
commercial purveyors of fMRI:
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In legal cases, No lie MRI will enable objective, scientific evidence regarding truth verification or lie detection to be submitted in a similar manner to which DNA evidence is used (available at http://www.noliemri.com [accessed July 2, 2007]).

and,
The objective measure of truth and deception that CEPHOS
offers will help protect the innocent and convict the guilty.
CEPHOS technology will also help litigators reach quick, favorable conclusions to high stakes judicial proceedings by providing pre-trial negotiating leverage and by bolstering the credibility of defendants and witnesses in the courtroom
CEPHOS gets frequent inquiries as to when we will begin to
offer fMRI testing on a commercial basis, generally from individuals who desire to prove their innocence in a court of
law. We are anxious to support such individuals and believe
that our technologies will soon enable us to do so (available at
http://www.cephoscorp.com [accessed July 2, 2007]).

The suggestion is that, when fMRI is reliable, it will be admissible and, specifically, that it will be admissible in relation
to credibility. This suggestion is echoed in academic publications in neuroethics. However, it is important to step back
from these promotional statements and academic reflections
and look carefully at the law on admissibility of evidence in
relation to credibility.
The leading case in Canada is the Supreme Court of
Canada decision R. v. Béland ([1987] 2 S.C.R. 398). The decision has never been overturned and there are no relevant
bases on which to distinguish polygraph from fMRI for the
purposes of assessing the admissibility of fMRI evidence in
relation to credibility given the content of the precedent set
in Béland.
In Béland, Justice McIntyre for the majority, did not decide polygraph evidence was inadmissible on reliability
grounds (“I would say at once that this view is not based
on a fear of the inaccuracies of the polygraph.” [R. v. Béland,
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 398 at 19]). Rather, he found that the admission of polygraph evidence would violate the following
well-established rules of evidence:
The rule against oath-helping (R. v. Béland, [1987] 2 S.C.R.
398 at 7-9). Before the Norman conquest, trials were conducted with “oath-helpers.” An accused or a defendant in
a civil suit would be entitled to call witnesses who would
testify that the oath of the accused or the defendant was true
and could be relied upon. However, unlike in the past, witnesses are now assumed to be honest. Not all are, but the
opposing party has the opportunity to show that any given
witness is not credible. However, if the opposing party does
not attack the witness’ honesty, the witness is assumed to
be honest. You don’t need evidence to “bolster” or “help”
the “oath” or the credibility of an unattacked witness (e.g.,
evidence about fMRI results) so there is a rule barring it.
The rule against prior consistent statements. When a witness takes the stand, she is not permitted to refer to statements she made prior to testifying in cases for which those
statements are being used to prove she is telling a version
of events on the stand that is the same as the version she
gave in the past. Such statements are prior in time to the testimony and their purported value is that they are consistent

68 ajob

with the testimony. However, they are excluded for many
reasons. First, you can tell a lie as consistently as you can
tell the truth. Consistency is not, of itself, a reliable indicator of veracity. Second, deceptive people can easily create
the prior consistent statements and plant them in advance
of their testimony (R. v. Béland, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 398 at 10).
Third, if the prior statement is of the accused who is now a
witness and it is being used by the accused to prove the truth
of a statement (e.g., “I didn’t kill her”) then it is hearsay and
excluded as self-serving evidence that is unreliable. Fourth,
trials must be efficient and admitting prior consistent statements would cause delay and distraction with no gain in
truth. The courts consider it best to have credibility decided
by people assessing the testimony of other people who are
in court, reporting what they saw, heard, or know about the
dispute at hand. There are exceptions to this rule but none
applied in Béland nor would any of them apply in relation
to the prior consistent statements of fMRI results.
The rule relating to character evidence. In the past, the accused was not permitted to testify but was allowed to call
witnesses as to his good character. However, such character
evidence was limited to the accused’s general reputation in
the community; witnesses were not allowed to detail any
specific acts regarding character because, it was believed,
that would take too much time and be too distracting. The
law changed and the accused was allowed to testify in her
own defense and it did not make sense thereafter to restrict
the accused to testimony about her own general reputation.
Therefore, the rules allow the accused as a witness to testify
about specific acts that illustrate the good character. The rule
did not change, however, with respect to testimony from
third parties about specific acts and, in Béland, the Court
held that polygraph evidence is tendered to “bolster the
credibility of the accused and, in effect, to show him to be
of good character by inviting the inference that he did not
lie during the test. In other words, it is evidence not of general reputation but of a specific incident and its admission
would be precluded under the rule” (R. v. Béland, [1987] 2
S.C.R. 398 at 14). fMRI results would similarly violate the
rule against anyone other than the accused (i.e., the fMRI
expert) providing evidence about a specific act illustrating
character (here credibility).
The rule on expert evidence. The testimony of an expert
must be outside the knowledge and experience of the trier
of fact (judge or jury) and be necessary for the correct disposal of the litigation. Credibility is generally seen as within
the capacity of the trier of fact. Indeed, people are seen by
the courts to be experts at assessing the credibility of other
people (R. v. Béland, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 398 at 20). Admission
of polygraph (or fMRI) results requires expert evidence that
goes to the issue of credibility and therefore violates this rule.
The rule on collateral facts. To prevent every trial from
going on endlessly and every witness being forced to
explain everything about their past actions, the rules of
evidence preclude the introduction of evidence on matters
that are “collateral” to the material facts in dispute. For
example, if a non-accused witness has lied or is sincerely
mistaken about her date of birth in a case in which that is
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entirely irrelevant, the law says the questioner is stuck with
the answer because the loss of time to call other witnesses to
prove the date of her birth is not worth the gain in accuracy
in resolving the primary issue in dispute. The credibility of a
witness is considered a “collateral” issue because it follows
every witness and therefore arises in every case. It is distinct
from the material issue of who did what, to whom, with
what mental state. fMRI results in relation to credibility
would be considered collateral facts and therefore ruled
inadmissible.
It is, of course, possible that the Supreme Court of
Canada, confronted with an fMRI case would overturn
Béland deciding that Béland had been wrongly decided or
that circumstances had changed such that Béland should no
longer be followed. To do so, however, would require finding the following to be true:

r the Béland majority’s balance between accuracy in individual cases and process commitments to fairness and
efficiency for all cases was wrong; or
r the science of fMRI is now such that the truth achieved
is worth the costs to the fairness and efficiencies of the
process; and
r the loss of involvement of the community in determinations of credibility will not undermine the community’s

attachment to the justice system such that its normative
validity is lost.
For now, however, following Béland, fMRI results that
go to credibility will not be admissible in Canada. Because
DNA is not admitted on credibility (although it, like any
evidence, can have the indirect effect of either bolstering or
impeaching it), it is not relevant as a precedent for fMRI.
fMRI results will not be able to be admitted “in a similar
manner to which DNA evidence is used.” fMRI will not be
able to be used for “bolstering the credibility of defendants
and witnesses in the courtroom.” “[I]ndividuals who desire
to prove their innocence in a court of law” will not be
able to do so through commercial test results offering
an “objective measure of truth and deception.” In other
words, the use of fMRI to detect deception will not provide
evidence admissible in Canadian courts for the purposes
of establishing credibility. 
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Functional Neuroimaging and the Law:
A Canadian Perspective
Ethan McMonagle, Dalhousie University
Tovino’s (2007) article does a good job canvassing some of
the legal issues raised by functional neuroimaging. However, it is a distinctly American perspective. Despite the burgeoning literature examining neuroethical issues and the
law, there is a conspicuous absence of Canadian content.
Since this technology will certainly confront the Canadian
legal system, I will here briefly examine some of the author’s constitutional concerns through the lens of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This response is limited to
the problem of compelling an accused to submit to a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scan as a legal
test for deception with respect to sections 8, 12 and 13 of the
Charter.
In Canada, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is the constitutionally entrenched protection of individual rights with
respect to state actions and actors. The Canadian judiciary
has the mandate of protecting and enforcing the Charter, and

if state actions or legislation are in violation of the Charter,
then Charter provisions will prevail. Compelling neuroimages is potentially in violation of several sections of the Charter, in much the same way that they may offend American
constitutional amendments.
MRI and fMRI technologies are not new to the Canadian
courts. In R. v. Hodgson ([2001] O.J. No. 5923), results from
brain-imaging scans presented compelling evidence that the
accused suffered from a mental disorder due to ischemic
attacks in his frontal lobe, thereby exculpating him from
charges of murder. Courts may accept this type of evidence
when the appropriate medical experts attest that an accused suffers from a condition that had a necessary and
sufficient causal role in their impugned behavior. Deception and credibility scans have not entered Canadian courts
and speculating that they might we must ask whether MRI
and fMRI evidence be compelled.
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